Edited text of a lecture delivered at an International Conference on the Islamic Revolution, at Exeter College, University of Oxford, August 1988
If a revolution is to be defined as a violent seizure of power and a transformation of the political and social affairs of a country, then the Iranian revolution has an eminent claim to being revolutionary. Not only did it change a powerful dynasty, which had ruled Iran for over fifty years, but it also put an end to a 2,600-year-old Iranian monarchy and also brought about a complete transformation in the political, economic and social direction of the society.
However, what makes the Iranian revolution unique and sets it apart from all other revolutions that have occurred in this century is the fact that for the first time in the history of Iran, and indeed for the first time in the history of Islam, a number of people have assumed power in the name of religion, and that, in the latter part of the twentieth century, in a country that was on the threshold of modernisation.
There is absolutely no precedent for the clergy to assume direct rule in any Islamic country. There have been many secular rulers and conquerors who have shown a great deal of religious zeal and fanaticism. There have also been many instances of usually weak rulers who have surrounded themselves with the members of the clergy and have tried to derive legitimacy through their association with the religious classes. But there has never been a period when the mullahs have directly assumed power and have declared themselves the only legitimate source of authority. The leading members of the present Iranian regime are themselves fully aware of this fact and emphasise that the only precedent for their rule is the time of Prophet Muhammad and the five years of the Caliphate of Imam ‘Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son‑in‑law who was appointed as the Fourth Caliph.[1]
The most important point to bear in mind is that although Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called the revolution that he led an Islamic Revolution, in fact, it was a sectarian Shi’i revolution and derived its legitimacy from the Shi’i concept about the Imamate, or the succession of the Prophet by Shi’i Imams, further elaborated by Khomeini’s concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Arabic al-Wilayat al-Faqih), or the governance or guardianship of the jurisprudent, which has been added to the concept of the Imamate. Had he really tried to model his revolution on the precedent set by Prophet Muhammad and had he followed the example of the prophet who after fleeing Mecca and living for eight years in Medina declared a general amnesty when he returned in triumph to Mecca, Khomeini would have been more successful. Instead, by establishing an intensely sectarian Shi’i revolution, he revived the centuries-old Shi’i-Sunni split and turned the majority of Sunni Muslims in the world against his regime.
In order to understand the basis of the claim of Iranian mullahs to power, it is essential to examine the Shi’i concept of succession to the Prophet and Khomeini’s concept of Velayat‑e Faqih, or the guardianship of Shi’i clerics. The Iranian revolution can be studied from many different angles, but this paper will concentrate on the Shi’i ideological justification of the revolution, Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat‑e Faqih, and his latest fatwas regarding the Velayat‑e Mutlaqe‑ye Faqih, or the absolute rule of the jurisprudent, which have greatly extended the scope of the rule of the clergy and have gone beyond anything which had been claimed by the Imams or even by the Prophet himself.
Succession to Prophet Muhammad
When the Prophet of Islam died in the year 632 AD without having left behind a clear successor, great controversy arose within the Islamic community, and the young Muslim society was faced with a major dilemma. Many tribes and individuals who had made a pledge of allegiance to Muhammad did not believe that they owed any loyalty to any other individual, and that with Muhammad’s death their personal pledge of allegiance to him had come to an end. This led to a major revolt by many of the tribes whose belief in Islam was very superficial and whose allegiance to Muhammad was more in the form of allegiance to a tribal chief or a political leader, rather than belief in a prophet. This rebellion is known as the Ridda Wars or Wars of Apostasy, which threatened the very survival of the nascent Islamic community and which took over a year to suppress.[2]
However, among the intimate ranks of Muhammad’s followers in Medina, the question of succession also posed a major problem, which split the Islamic community down the ages and constituted the major source of disagreement between the majority Sunni and the minority Shi’i sects. After Muhammad’s death, those who had migrated with him from Mecca (Muhajirun) believed that they had the supreme claim to his succession, because they were the earliest believers and were companions of the Prophet, and because most of them also belonged to the Prophet’s tribe of Quraysh.
Those believers in Medina who had championed his cause when he was faced with opposition and persecution in Mecca and who had invited him to Yathrib (later renamed Madinat al‑Nabi, or the City of the Prophet, now known as Medina), known as Helpers (Ansar), claimed that they had indeed saved Islam from extinction and, therefore, the Prophet’s successor should be chosen from among their ranks. Meanwhile, the immediate members of the Prophet’s family claimed that, according to age‑old Arab traditions, succession was theirs by right, and that ‘Ali as the Prophet’s cousin and son‑in‑law was, despite his youth, the most qualified person to succeed him.
As the members of Muhammad’s family were busy arranging for his burial, two groups had already gathered in Medina arguing about the issue of succession to the Prophet and the leadership of the community. One group consisted mainly of Abu Bakr, Omar and other prominent Meccans (the Muhajirun), and the second of the most eminent Medinans (the Ansar). In the immediate aftermath of Muhammad’s death, a gathering of the Ansar took place at the Saqifa (courtyard) of the Banu Sa’ida clan trying to choose a successor to Muhammad.
When news reached the Meccans that the Medinans were contemplating to pledge their support to one of their leaders, Sa’d ibn ‘Ubadah, Abu Bakr, Umar and some other leading Meccans rushed to Saqifa of Banu-Sa’ida to put their claim to successorship. Once there, Abu Bakr warned the Ansar that Arabs would not recognize the rule of anyone outside of Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraysh. Furthermore, the Muhajirun had accepted Islam first and were closer to Muhammad in kinship. Some suggested that the Quraysh and the Ansar should choose their separate rulers among themselves. However, after a great deal of argument, eventually, all of them stretched out their hands to Abu Bakr and chose him as their first Caliph (Khalifa or successor to the Prophet), the first of the so-called Rashidun caliphs.
Abu Bakr was one of the most senior disciples of the Prophet and the first person to believe in him outside his immediate family. He had also accompanied Muhammad when he fled from Mecca to Medina, and had also represented him at prayers during Muhammad’s illness. Abu Bakr’s appointment was later endorsed by most of the believers and even ‘Ali did not openly challenge his legitimacy. However, there was a handful of men who refused to give their allegiance to Abu Bakr and who believed that ‘Ali was a more suitable person to succeed the Prophet. They came to regard ‘Ali as the first Imam, or the spiritual heir to the Prophet and were known as Shi’at ‘Ali (‘Ali’s faction), usually known as Shi’ism.[3] However, Ali himself did not oppose Abu Bakr’s caliphate and at times he even represented him at some functions.
The Wars of Apostasy
Abu Bakr’s brief two‑year caliphate was almost entirely spent in putting down a rebellion that broke out after Muhammad’s death, known as the Ridda Wars or the Wars of Apostasy (632-633). During the last years of Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime in Medina, a large number of Arab tribes had converted to Islam and pledged allegiance (bey’a) to him as their spiritual and political leader. However, when he died many of those tribes were keen to return to their old customs and religious traditions, arguing that their allegiance had been to Muhammad and not to his successors. Some tribal leaders even went as far as claiming prophethood themselves.
Clearly, faith in Islam and its teachings had not sunk deeply among the members of those tribes or the population as a whole. Many of these rebels also resented the zakat tax that they had to pay. Therefore, not only did several tribes refuse to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr, but they even renounced their allegiance to the Muslim community as a whole, and took part in the wars against the new caliph, hence the term Ridda or apostasy.
Shortly before his death, Abu Bakr appointed Omar (‘Umar) ibn Khattab as his successor and received pledges of support for Omar from many prominent believers. Omar ruled for ten years and during his caliphate, Islam spread far and wide and the Islamic Empire was born. It was during his rule that Arab forces attacked Iran and put an end to the Sassanian Empire, as well as conquering the eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire. The engagement in constant wars of conquest and the enormous amount of booty that flooded Arabia from conquered Iranian and Byzantine towns and cities encouraged many Muslims to support Omar and the new Islamic system. Again, there was no sign of great friction between Omar and ‘Ali and, indeed, when Omar was away on the expedition to Jerusalem he put ‘Ali in charge of the affairs in Medina.
Before his assassination at the hands of an Iranian captive, Omar had appointed a council of six men, including ‘Ali, to decide the issue of leadership after him. The majority of the Council voted for ‘Uthman ibn Affan who duly became the Third Caliph. ‘Uthman’s Caliphate was something of a disaster for Islam, and his rule was marked by weakness and nepotism. Soon after he assumed power, there was disaffection in the provinces, and delegations from Egypt and Iran arrived in Medina in 656 AD voicing strong protest to the Caliph. As their demands were not heeded, they attacked ‘Uthman in his house and murdered him. Immediately after the murder of ‘Uthman, the crowd surrounded ‘Ali, urging him to accept the caliphate. It was under these inauspicious circumstances that ‘Ali was chosen as the Fourth Caliph in 656, 24 years after the Prophet’s death.
One of the first problems to beset ‘Ali was a rebellion organised against him by Talha and Zubayr, two of the most prominent Companions of the Prophet, as well as ‘A’isha, Abu Bakr’s daughter and the Prophet’s widow, who marched to Basra in the name of seeking vengeance for ‘Uthman’s assassination. At the battle of al‑Jamal (the Camel) that broke out between the two sides ‘Ali was victorious. Talha and Zubayr were killed and ‘A’isha was captured. After this battle, ‘Ali moved his headquarters to Kufa, within the territory of the former Sassanian Empire, and thus removed the centre of power away from Arabia, as it happened forever, as later Damascus became the next seat of the caliphate, followed by Baghdad, near the old Iranian capital at Ctesiphon, which became the seat of the Abbasid Caliphate, and finally by the Ottoman Empire whose emperors took on the title of caliph and ruling from Constantinople, renamed Istanbul.
A more serious challenge came from Mu’awiyya, the Governor of Syria and a close relative of ‘Uthman, who marched towards Kufa in 657 AD. The battle, which was fought between the two armies at Siffin, was bloody and inconclusive. It ended with a call for arbitration, which went in favour of Mu’awiyya. At this point, a group of ultra‑fanatical Muslims, known as Khawarij (Seceders), revolted against ‘Ali and his acceptance of arbitration. Later, a member of the Khawarij struck ‘Ali with a sword on 27 January 661, and he died two days later as a result of his wounds.
Thus ended the period of the “Orthodox Caliphate.” ‘Ali’s five‑year Caliphate was marred by continuous fighting which, in fact, constituted the first period of infighting among Muhammad’s closest aides and followers. As we have seen, apart from Abu Bakr who ruled for two years and had to fight the Ridda War with those who rebelled against his caliphate, all other three caliphs were assassinated in what amounted to an early civil war within Islam.
As a side-line to this period of conflict among the early Muslim leaders, there is a tradition attributed to Prophet Muhammad, known as al-ʿashara al-mubashshara, the ten people who were given the glad tiding by Muhammad that they would certainly go to paradise. The list included all the four Orthodox Caliphs, including the fourth caliph Ali, as well as Talha ibn Ubayd-Allah and Zubayr ibn Awwam who fought against Ali and who were killed in the battle. It is not clear which of those deadly rivals will go to heaven and which one will be denied the privilege.
The Umayyad Caliphate
Meanwhile, Mu’awiyya had established the Umayyad Caliphate in Syria and declared himself the sole ruler of the Muslims. Although ‘Ali’s eldest son, Hasan, decided not to challenge Mu’awiyya and abdicated in his favour, retiring on a large pension, the Shi’is believed that he was the Second rightful Imam and that Mu’awiyya’s rule was illegitimate.
Hasan died in 669 AD, and his younger brother, Hussein (Hussein), the third Shi’i Imam, became the head of the House of ‘Ali. So long as Mu’awiyya was alive, Hussein made no move; but, on Mu’awiyya’s death in 680 AD, Hussein was invited by the Kufans to assume their leadership. Hussein left Mecca for Kufa, but on the way, he was met by the forces of ‘Ubaydu’llah ibn Ziyad, who had been appointed Governor of Kufa by Yazid, Mu’awiyya’s son and successor.
On 10th Muharram AH 61 (10 October 680), which is known as ‘Ashura (the Tenth Day of the month of Muharram), the most tragic event in the history of Islam according to the Shi’is took place, and Hussein, the Prophet’s favourite grandson, and 72 of his relatives and companions were mercilessly killed by ‘Ubaydullah’s forces led by Shimr ibn Sa’d. Their bodies were decapitated, and their heads were raised on spears and carried back to Kufa. This massacre marks the most important event in the Shi’i calendar, and up to this day is commemorated with huge processions, wailing and self‑flagellation. Apart from the Shi’is, the killing of the son of the fourth Rashidun Caliph and Prophet Muhammad’s favourite grandson must be regarded as a most heinous action by Muslims as a whole.
The martyrdom of Imam Hussein is regarded by the Shi’is as a deliberate act of self‑sacrifice and a valiant rejection of a tyrannical ruler. They regard it as the supreme and exemplary symbol of standing up for truth and against tyranny and injustice. Some accounts of the tragedy of Karbala, however, indicate that Imam Hussein did not set out deliberately to be killed. When he was invited by the Kufans to assume their leadership, as a precautionary measure, he first sent his cousin, Muslim ibn ‘Aqil, to Kufa to assess the situation. Muslim arrived in Kufa before Yazid had appointed ‘Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad to take control of Kufa. Muslim ibn ‘Aqil was received warmly by the Kufans, and he sent reassuring messages of support to Imam Hussein.
When Imam Hussein set out for Kufa and was intercepted by ‘Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad’s forces, he first asked to be allowed to return to Mecca or to be taken directly to Yazid. He is reported to have said: “Suffer me to return to the place from whence I came; if not, then lead me to Yazid, the Caliph, at Damascus, and place my hand in his, that I may speak with him face to face; or, if thou wilt do neither of these things, then send me far away to the wars, where I shall fight, the Caliph’s faithful soldier, against the enemies of Islam.”[4]
However, Ubaydu’llah insisted on Imam Hussein’s unconditional surrender, something that Imam Hussein could not have accepted in view of his position as a former Caliph’s son and the Prophet’s grandson, and instead he opted for heroic battle rather than ignoble surrender. None of this, of course, means that he deliberately courted death; but to the Shi’is, his martyrdom is regarded as the supreme act of self-sacrifice in the path of righteousness.
His martyrdom has assumed some of the mystical significance and symbolism that surrounds the death of Jesus on the Cross. It is a rallying call to all the Shi’is throughout the ages not to submit to injustice and tyranny, and to sacrifice their lives for the protection of God’s religion. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of the cult of martyrdom to the Shi’is and the use that has been made of this tragic event by mullahs throughout the ages to arouse the faithful against the unjust rulers whom they describe as the spiritual heirs of Yazid and Shimr.[5]
It is important to note that after Imam Hussein’s martyrdom, all Shi’i Imams led quietist lives, never openly challenging the Umayyad or Abbasid rulers. They busied themselves with providing moral and spiritual guidance to their band of followers, shunning any involvement in politics. Imam Hussein’s son, Zayn al-‘Abidin, the Fourth Imam, spent his life in a state of seclusion and retirement occupied with prayers and meditation, thus acquiring the title of Sajjad (the Prostrator). Zayn al-‘Abidin’s eldest son and the Fifth Imam, Muhammad al‑Baqir, followed his father’s quietist policies and restricted himself to the claim of religious rather than political leadership. Many of his followers actually left him and went to his half‑brother, Zayd, because al‑Baqir refused to be involved in politics.[6] The followers of those who turned to Zayd still constitute a Shi’a sect and are known as the Zaydis. A large part of the Muslims in Yemen are Zaydis.
The Shi’i jurisprudence is sometimes referred to as Ja’fari jurisprudence, as Imam Ja’far al‑Sadiq, the Sixth Shi’i Imam, was the person who did most to elaborate and codify the Shi’i doctrine. One of the most important concepts set forth by Imam Ja’far al‑Sadiq was the separation of religion and politics. He conceded that the Caliphs possessed temporal power, but he argued that the Kingdom of the Imams is not of this world. They are moral and spiritual teachers of society, and their inability to seize power should not be regarded as a sign of failure. He emphasised the importance of nass (designation) and ‘ilm (knowledge) as the hallmarks of the Imams. As Hodgson points out, “The idea of an imamate by nass, restricted to a definite individual out of all the ‘Alids, continuing through all political circumstances, was complemented by that of an imamate based not primarily on a political claim, but on special knowledge, ‘ilm.”[7] Hand in hand with this otherworldly and pietistic interpretation of the role of the Imams went a de‑emphasis on the Islamic ‘political ethic. The Shi’i practice of taqiyya (dissimulation of faith) also dates from al‑Sadiq’s time.[8]
This has been the interpretation of the role of the Imam — as opposed to the role of the Caliphs ‑ by the vast majority of Shi’i scholars throughout the ages. The Shi’i ulema regarded themselves as society’s conscience, that they had to speak out against tyranny and injustice, but never to assume direct power. In fact, the Shi’i theory of the state as elaborated by the two most authoritative Shi’i scholars, al‑Kulayni (d. 939) and Ibn Babawayh (d. 991), headed in the direction of bringing together the earlier Islamic conception of the Caliphate and the Greek conception of the philosopher king. The Shi’i theory of government laid the foundations of the idea of monarchical absolutism.[9] Shi’i scholars argued that absolute monarchy constituted a necessity and hence the absolute monarch was alone the true vicegerent of God.[10]
Later Shi’i writers, such as Najm al‑Din Razi and Fakhr al‑Din Razi in the thirteenth century, described the kings as the “representatives of the Hidden Imam” and the “shadow of God on earth.” After the establishment of the Safavid state in 1501, several Shi’i thinkers developed the theme that the monarchs were the Na’ibs or vice‑regents of the Hidden Imam. The same view was held by the Shi’i clergy during the Qajar period (1779‑1925) and up to the end of the monarchical rule in Iran. Some leading ulema of the Qajar period, such as Mirza Abu’l‑Qasim Qumi (d.1816) and Sayyid Ja’far Kashfi (d. 1850) produced a fully developed Shi’i political theory that tried to justify the Qajar dynasty.[11]
Later, in 1925, Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, declared himself king; his position was endorsed by the fatwa of the most eminent Shi’i mujtahids of the time. Sayyid Abu’l‑Hasan Isfahani and Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Na’ini, in a manifesto, declared: “It is obligatory for us to inform the people not to deviate from this Muslim circle [the government of Reza Shah], which gives currency to Islam. Those who oppose this command will be considered infidels.”[12]
Therefore, in Akhavai’s words: “Twelver Shi’ism accepts the existence of a temporal ruler as a necessity for order and prosperity, even if it denies his legitimacy in the ultimate sense. And, in an apparent paradox, this leads to de facto support for the temporal ruler because he is the guarantor of the commonweal.”[13]
This is a very important point to remember, especially given the concept of Velayat-e Faqih put forward by Khomeini, which goes completely against the historical facts and clear precedents set by Shi’i scholars. Some Iranian and Western writers, commenting on the religious aspect of the Iranian revolution, have taken it for granted that the ideas put forward by Khomeini were authentic extensions of Shi’i history. The truth, however, is that there is hardly any precedent for the kind of ideas expounded by Khomeini, and his interpretation of Shi’ism is an innovation and a complete departure from Shi’i jurisprudence, which has been traditionally quietist and supportive of the governments in power, rather than being active and revolutionary.
THE HIDDEN IMAM
Practically, after the death of every Imam, the Shi’i community split into various factions and sects. So, there are many Shi’i sects. The sect predominant in Iran is the Ithna ‘Ashari or Twelver Shi’ism. According to this sect, there were twelve rightful Imams after the Prophet. They further believe that the Twelfth Imam disappeared from public view and would return to the world at some future date to inaugurate a reign of justice, according to some, or a reign of terror, according to others who believe 12 flour mills will run with the blood of the infidels who will be killed by the Hidden Imam. His return would be the precursor of the Day of Judgement or the end of the world. As the issue of the Twelfth Imam’s Occultation is at the centre of Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat‑e Faqih and of the Shi’i philosophy as a whole, it is important to explore this doctrine further.
The Ninth Shi’i Imam, Muhammad al‑Taq, was only seven when his father, Ali ar‑Rida, died and he assumed the position of the Ninth Imam; his father was only 23 when he died in 833 AD. Similarly, the Tenth Imam, ‘Ali al‑Hadi, was also seven when he assumed the Imamate. The Eleventh Imam, Hasan al‑’Askari, was 22 when he became Imam, and he died in 873 AD at the age of 27. These Imams, due to their young age, were very rarely seen by their followers, were in effective occultation, and communicated with their followers through agents or intermediaries. When Imam Hasan al-‘Askari died at the age of 27, he apparently had no children. His brother Ja’far, who firmly stated that Imam Hasan al‑’Askari had died childless, has been vilified by generations of Shi’is as Kazzab, the Liar.
This break in the line of the Imams threw the Shi’i community into confusion, and the Shi’is broke up into some twenty different sects. Some were prepared to accept the deceased Imam’s brother, Ja’far, as the Twelfth Imam, while others believed that the Eleventh Imam himself had gone into occultation. However, the version which is accepted by the orthodox Twelver Shi’is is the one put forward by ‘Uthman al‑’Amri, who had acted as Secretary and intermediary to both the Tenth and the Eleventh Imams, and who had also received the religious dues paid by the faithful on behalf of the Imams. According to many Shia sources, even in the historical works of Ibn Babuya, the circumstances of the birth of the Twelfth Imam, details about his mother, and his short life were miraculous, and they must be considered as hagiography, rather than history.
According to al‑’Amri, the Eleventh Imam had a young child called Muhammad, who was not known to the public due to his young age. Various supernatural and miraculous stories have surrounded the history of the birth and occultation of the Twelfth Imam. There are also many contradictions and unexplained facts regarding him. The mother of the Twelfth Imam has been variously called Narjis‑Khatun (a combination of a Persian and a Turkish word), or Sawsan, or Rayhana. Narjis‑Khatun, by which the mother is better known, is said to be a Byzantine slave girl, or, according to other traditions, a black slave from Africa.
However, according to some other accounts, Narjis‑Khatun was the daughter of an unspecified Byzantine Emperor who saw Imam Hasan al‑’Askari in a dream and fell in love with him. They were married in another dream by the Prophet of Islam himself. She was told in yet another dream to take part in a battle between Muslim and Byzantine forces, dressed as a boy. She was told that she would be captured by Muslim forces and brought to the Eleventh Imam. This she did, and soon after being united with the Imam, she bore him a child in Samarra between 868 and 873 AD. Most accounts put his birth in 869 AD.
At his birth, the infant began to speak and made the profession of faith. After the death of his father, he was a young child, although according to other accounts, he had miraculously grown to be a mature man. His only contact with his followers was allegedly through Uthman al‑’Amri, the Eleventh Imam’s intermediary with the people, who had been asked by the Hidden Imam to continue the position that he had held under the two previous Imams.[14]
Before his death, ‘Uthman nominated his son, Abu-Ja’far Muhammad ibn ‘Uthman, as his successor and for forty‑five years, the father and son laid claim to being the agents of the Hidden Imam. They were involved in bitter disputes with the Eleventh Imam’s brother, Ja’far and his followers, who denied the existence of the mysterious infant and who laid claim to his brother’s estate and to the donations which were offered by the Shi’is. However, Muhammad ibn ‘Uthman persisted with his claim that he was in contact with the Hidden Imam and was his sole agent.
After the death of Muhammad al‑’Amri, Abu’l‑Qasim Hussein ibn Ruh an‑Nawbakhti became the agent of the Hidden Imam in 917 AD, to be succeeded in 938 AD by the last agent, Abu’l‑Hussein ‘Ali ibn-Muhammad as‑Samarri. These deputies of the Hidden Imam, especially Ibn Ruh Nawbakhti, amassed great wealth, consisting of donations made by the faithful to the Hidden Imam.[15]
By the time of the fourth agent, the Hidden Imam should have been about seventy years old, and many of his followers insisted that it was about time for the Hidden Imam to reveal himself. So, in 941 AD Muhammad as‑Samarri produced a message from the Hidden Imam, saying that so far he had been in Minor Occultation (Gheybat Sughra), but from that day onward he would start his period of Major Occultation (Gheybat Kubra) and would not be seen by anyone until his final return: “For the Second Occultation has come and there will not now be a manifestation except by the permission of God and that after a long time has passed, and hearts have hardened and the earth become filled with tyranny. And there will come to my Shi’a those who claim to have seen me, but he who claims to have seen me before the emergence of the Sufyani and the [cosmic] battle‑cry (Shayha) is assuredly a lying impostor.”[16] The Hidden Imam’s reappearance will usher in the “Lesser Resurrection” (Qiyamat Sughra) to be followed by the end of the world or the “Greater Resurrection” (Qiyamat Kubra).[17]
Meanwhile, during the Greater Occultation, the Hidden Imam is still the spiritual guide and light of the world, with the difference that there is no longer any direct communication between humanity and the Imam. Therefore, after 941 AD, the date of the disappearance of the Hidden Imam, there has been no earthly expression of the Imamate. However, it is still possible to seek the Twelfth Imam’s advice or intercession by writing him a letter and leaving it at one of the Shi’i shrines, or in the well where he is believed to dwell. There has been no shortage of people who have claimed to have seen him in a dream or a vision, or who have personified his reincarnation or reappearance. There is much that is miraculous about the Mahdi. The various traditions are rich in stories and are often contradictory. Meanwhile, the Hidden Imam is believed to be hiding in a well in Samarra or in a mythical city called Jabulqa or Jabulsa, or, according to others, in a well in Jamkaran near Qom.
This, in brief, is the history of the Hidden Imam who is also known by many honorific titles, including Sahib az‑Zaman (Lord of the Age), Sahib al‑Amr (Lord of Command), al‑Mahdi (the Rightly Guided One), al‑Qa’im (He who will arise), al‑Imam al-Muntazar (the Awaited Imam), Baqiyyat Allah (the Remnant of God), and Vali-Allah A’zam (God’s Supreme Vice‑Regent). At the mention of his name at Friday prayer sermons, the whole congregation arises in anticipation of his Second Coming, and any mention of his name is followed by the phrase “Ajjal‑Allah Ta’ala Farajah ash‑Sharif” (May God hasten his noble advent). One of the most popular slogans chanted by the people in Iran when meeting with Khomeini or after his speeches is “Khodaya Khodaya, ta enqilab‑i Mahdi‑ Khomeini ra nigahdar” (Oh God, Oh God, keep Khomeini alive until the uprising of Mahdi).
The four intermediaries between the people and the Hidden Imam were known as Bab (Gate, plural Abwab) or Na’ib (Vice‑Regent, plural Nuwwab) of the Hidden Imam, a title which is now conferred upon Khomeini, as he is often referred to as “Na’ib-e Imam Zaman” or Vice-Regent of the Lord of the Age. This brings us to a study of Khomeini’s theory concerning the Velayat‑e Faqih.
VELAYAT‑E FAQIH
Khomeini expounded his views about the role of the clerics in an Islamic government in a series of lectures he gave in Najaf between 21 January and 8 February 1970 on the issue of Velayat‑e Faqih (The Governance or Guardianship of Jurisprudent), later compiled and published under the title of Hukumat‑i Islami (Islamic Government).[18]
Having boldly asserted in the very first sentence of the book that “The governance of the faqih is a subject that in itself elicits immediate assent and has little need of demonstration”,[19] Khomeini goes on to say in the second paragraph: “From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti‑Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present.” By skipping an entire millennium, Khomeini goes on to add: “Later they were joined by other groups, who were in certain respects more satanic than they. These new groups began their imperialist penetration of the Muslim countries about three hundred years ago, and they regarded it as necessary to work for the extirpation of Islam in order to attain their ultimate goals.”
After further accusing Western imperialists and their local agents of distorting Islamic teachings and propagating the erroneous idea that Islam is purely concerned with spiritual and devotional matters or insinuating that Islamic injunctions are defective, Khomeini states: “There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm.”[20] He goes into great detail showing that the Prophet did not merely promulgate laws, but was also an executor of the law and acted in the capacity of a ruler: “For example, he implemented the penal provisions of Islam: he cut off the hand of the thief and administered lashings and stonings. The successors to the Prophet must do the same.”[21] His use of the term “The successors to the Prophet” is interesting because it clearly refers to his concept of Velayat-e Faqih and the role that senior clerics must play in the absence of the Prophet.
Referring to the issue of succession to the Prophet, Khomeini follows the usual Shi’i line that the history of Islam was distorted from the very beginning by the Sunnis for rejecting Imam ‘Ali, who was the only legitimate successor to the Prophet. He says: “After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), the obstinate enemies of the faith, the Umayyads (God’s curses be upon them) did not permit the Islamic state to attain stability with the rule of ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib (upon whom be peace).”[22]
Nevertheless, according to Khomeini, the ten‑year ministry of the Prophet in Medina and the five‑year Caliphate of Imam ‘Ali provide a model for proper Islamic government which should be emulated by all Muslims. After the death of Imam ‘Ali, the other eleven Imams were the true rulers of the Muslim community, although they were denied the ability to perform their executive functions. Now, what should the Muslim community do during the Major Occultation of the Twelfth Imam? The laws of Islam cannot be cast aside and remain unexecuted. On the other hand, if the laws are to be executed, who are the individuals who are best qualified to implement them? Khomeini has a clear and categorical answer to that. He believes that the fuqaha, or Muslim jurisprudents, are the only people qualified to rule. “It is an established principle,” he asserts, “that the faqih has authority over the ruler. If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the faqih, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true rulers are fuqaha themselves, and rule ought officially to be theirs.”[23]
Khomeini quotes a large number of hadith (traditions or sayings attributed to the Prophet and the Imams), including one from the Hidden Imam himself, which allegedly supports his argument that the fuqaha should be the rulers of Islamic societies. However, he makes it quite clear that the fuqaha have no right to make laws and have no authority except to implement the laws of the Koran. He says, “Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine laws over men… The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate, and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator.”[24]
Khomeini strongly criticises the secular governments that are in power in Islamic lands, and he also attacks the imported laws which form the basis of national constitutions and judicial systems of most Islamic countries. He is critical of the Iranian Parliament because all the necessary laws are laid down in Islam, and Islamic governments merely have to execute them. “It is for this reason,” he continues, “that in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly that is one of the three branches of the government.”[25]
It is interesting that while Khomeini bases his entire argument on the Shi’i concept of succession to the Prophet, his emphasis on the importance of the law is much closer to the Sunni beliefs; because whereas Shi’ism puts the emphasis on the immaculate nature of the Imams and their descent from the Prophet as well as their divinely‑guided mission to interpret the Koran or to reveal new guidance through ijtihad (the use of reason for passing religious judgement), the Sunnis emphasise the importance of Koranic laws. Echoing the Sunnis, Khomeini asserts: “Islamic government is a government of law… Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (peace be upon him) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity…. Individual opinion, even if it be that of the Prophet himself, cannot intervene in matters of government or divine law.”[26]
According to Khomeini, not only is the faqih the chief executive in an Islamic government, but he is also the chief judge of the system and “the function of judge belongs exclusively to the just faqih.”[27] In short, as the rightful vice‑regent of the Prophet and the Imams, the fuqaha enjoy all their powers and privileges. Khomeini sums up his argument thus: “Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the faqih is the legatee of the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace and blessings), and, in addition, during the occultation of the Imam, he is the leader of the Muslims and the chief of the community.”[28]
Khomeini stresses that the faqih should be uncompromising in the administration of Koranic injunctions and should not be affected by either defect or excess. If the Prophet cut off the hands of the thief or gave a hundred lashes to the adulterer, so should the faqih, “in the exact manner that has been specified.” When it comes to taxation, the faqih “does not have the right to levy even a shahi [penny] above what the Islamic law provides.”[29] Following in the footsteps of the Prophet, the faqih should not give in to emotions in the administration of the law and should be stern towards those who harm the interests of Islam.
He cites the alleged massacre of 700 men of the Jewish tribe of Bani Qurayza by the Prophet as an example of how to deal with the trouble‑makers: “Since the Jews of Bani Qurayza were a troublesome group, causing corruption in Muslim society and damaging Islam and the Islamic state, the Most Noble Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) eliminated them.”[30] It should be added that many scholars have doubted the veracity of that report and believe that it was a much later addition to the history of early Islam. There is no contemporary report of that massacre.
As early as 1970, when Khomeini delivered those lectures, he clearly predicted that he would be able to topple the Shah’s rule and establish an Islamic government. He promised: “When we come to power, we will not only put the country’s political life, economy and administration in order, we will also whip and chastise the thieves and the liars.”[31] Moreover, even from that early period in his campaign, his horizon was not limited to Iran, and he exhorted Muslims throughout the world to rise up against their secular governments and overthrow their rulers. Having purged the Islamic world of corrupt regimes, all Muslims would unite behind the leadership of Khomeini, or another faqih, and would establish the universal Islamic state. In a remarkable passage, which provides a foretaste of his later calls for the exportation of the Islamic revolution, Khomeini writes:
“We have in reality then no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive and criminal regimes. This is a duty that all Muslims must fulfil in every one of the Muslim countries, to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam. We see, too, that together the imperialists and the tyrannical self‑seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic umma from each other and artificially created separate nations.”[32]
Although in this book Khomeini has tried to base his arguments on Islamic and particularly Shi’i principles, there are many serious problems in his thesis:
1. It is remarkable that in the vast compendium of genuine or spurious Islamic traditions, which run into thousands and fill dozens of volumes, Khomeini has not been able to find any tradition which directly refers to the Velayat‑e Faqih, or openly sanctions the rule of the clergy. Instead, he has had to resort to torturous arguments to make some weak traditions fit into his scheme of things.
2. He has not been able to find a single verse in the Koran that supports his argument. On the contrary, a famous verse in the Koran, namely, “0 you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority among you”,[33] clearly enjoins obedience to those who are in power and contradicts Khomeini’s insistence regarding the rule of the fuqaha. Merely to turn around that verse and assert that “the holders of authority among you” refers to the fuqaha is very unconvincing, especially as it is not supported by other verses in the Koran or by the usual interpretation of that verse by various eminent commentators.
3. Khomeini’s insistence on the need for the governance of the faqih contradicts what he had himself clearly stated in his earlier works. For example, in his other famous book, Kashf al‑Asrar (The Unveiling of Secrets), written in 1943, he had categorically stated: “We do not say that government must be in the hands of the faqih: rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God’s law, for the welfare of the country and the people demands this, and it is not possible except with the supervision of the religious leaders.”[34] Here, a major leap has been taken from the need for supervision by the faqih to the absolute necessity of the governance of the faqih.
4. In his book on Islamic Government, Khomeini asserts: “Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid.”[35] If hereditary succession is wrong and is rejected by Islam, Khomeini does not explain how; then, is it possible for the Shi’is to believe in the hereditary succession of the Imams, based on which they reject the Caliphate? It is also interesting that after toppling the last Qajar king, Reza Khan wanted to establish a republic, but all the leading clerics of the time, including Khomeini’s teachers and mentors, opposed it, saying that throughout its history, Islamic societies have been run based on monarchic rule and republics were anti-Islamic.
5. If it is incumbent upon the Imam and the fuqaha to rule ‑ and Khomeini criticises earlier fuqaha for having neglected their duty ‑ is he not then blaming the Imams, with the possible exception of Imam ‘Ali and Imam Hussein, for the relegation of their responsibility in not rising up against the tyrannical rulers of their time whom Khomeini condemns in the strongest terms for their treachery to Islam. Even assuming that the Imams tried but failed ‑ something which is not supported by history ‑ why was the Twelfth Imam in a state of Minor Occultation for some seventy years, instead of trying to regain his usurped position? Furthermore, what has been the position of the Muslims in the past twelve hundred years since the Major Occultation of the Imam? Have all Islamic societies failed and been in error until Khomeini’s appearance?
6. If the only true Islamic rule was achieved at the time of the Prophet and Imam ‘Ali, should not one conclude that Islam has failed ever since? Moreover, if Islamic teachings have been in abeyance for 1,400 years, even during the lifetime of most of the Imams, by what right does Khomeini claim that he has been entrusted with the task of the restoration of Islam after all this time?
Khomeini’s Velayat‑e Faqih has been based on a clear distortion of the history of Islam and raises many more questions than it answers. His main aim has been to gain power, and he has tried to make facts fit his implausible thesis. Militant Shi’i movements, such as that of Khawarij, the revolt of the Zaydis (740), or the militant wing of the Nizari Isma’ilis (the Assassins) have been short-lived and have often come from outside the mainline Twelver Shi’ism; while the legitimacy of the major Shi’i Iranian dynasties, such as the Buyids (940-1055), the Safavids (1501-1722) or the Qajars (1779-1925) has never been questioned by the clergy.[36]
CLERICAL OPPOSITION TO MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH’S REFORMS
Many books have already been written on the Iranian revolution, and it is not the intention of this paper to investigate the political, economic and social causes leading to that revolution. However, as far as the religious dimensions of the revolution are concerned, a few points need to be stressed.
Khomeini’s active opposition to the late Shah’s rule dates from 1962, when the government of Prime Minister Asadollah Alam approved a cabinet decree which provided for the election of local councils throughout the country. This measure was intended for the expansion of democracy at the local level and greater participation by the people in their own affairs. The law allowed women to vote for the first time, and it was also specified that elected councillors would take their oath of office on “their holy book” and not solely on the Koran, thus opening the way for the participation of the members of religious minorities in the elections.
Both measures were strongly opposed by reactionary members of the clergy, led by Khomeini. In emotional speeches and declarations, he aroused the masses against giving votes to women, describing it as a measure “to corrupt our chaste women”, and against the participation of religious minorities in the elections, alleging that it was a move to undermine Islam and to allow the Baha’is and other religious minorities to hold office.[37]
He sent personal messages to the Shah and the Prime Minister, saying that the new measure violated the Constitution and Islamic law, and had to be repealed. In wild statements aimed at whipping up public emotions, he charged that the local council law was “perhaps drawn up by the spies of the Jews and the Zionists… The Koran and Islam are in danger. The independence of the state and the economy are threatened by a takeover by the Zionists, who in Iran have appeared in the guise of Baha’is.”[38] Under the weight of clerical opposition and mass protest, the government suspended the local council law.
In the same year, the Shah announced a series of reforms for the modernisation of Iran, which came to be known as the “White Revolution.” One of the main principles of the White Revolution was land reform, based on which huge estates of rich, absentee landlords would be purchased from them by the state and distributed among the farmers who previously did not own any land. The land reform was aimed at removing a grave historical injustice against the majority of the Iranian population that lived in abject poverty and oppression in villages and transforming a feudal society into a modern, industrialised one. The provisions of the land reform law included the crown lands, as well as religious endowment properties that constituted a major source of income for the clergy.
This aroused the anger of the mullahs, who denounced the land reform as contrary to Islamic principles. Ayatollah Mohammad Behbahani, a prominent clerical leader, made a direct appeal to the Prime Minister to exempt the religious endowments, but his plea was rejected. On 26 January 1963, the Shah submitted land reform and five other measures, including the Literacy Corps plan for sending conscripts as teachers to villages, and measures for the nationalisation of forests and pastureland, to a national referendum. The government announced a 99.9 per cent “yes” vote in the referendum, and there is no doubt that the land reform was highly popular in the villages and in the country at large.
Due to its great popularity, Khomeini was careful not to attack the land reform openly, but he continued his anti‑government agitation, dismissing the entire reform programme as a fraud and declaring the new Iranian year, starting in March, as a “time for mourning, not celebration.” He continued inciting the masses against the government, and on 3 June 1963, on Ashura, at the height of mourning ceremonies on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, when religious feelings run very high, he made a strong speech against the Shah, calling him an agent of Israel bent on the destruction of Islam. Having been previously warned not to continue his personal attacks against the Shah and Israel in his sermons, Khomeini remarked: “What connection is there between the Shah and Israel? … Mr Shah! Perhaps they want to depict you as a Jew, so that I should declare you an infidel, and they [the people] should throw you out of Iran.”[39]
These inflammatory speeches led to a great deal of anti‑government unrest in the country, and the government felt obliged to detain Khomeini and transfer him from Qom to Tehran. The news of his detention led to violent demonstrations in many Iranian cities, as a result of which some demonstrators were killed by the security forces.
Khomeini was kept in detention for ten months, but as soon as he was released, he resumed his anti‑government campaign. When in October 1964 the Iranian Parliament approved a bill, called “The Status of Forces Law,” which extended diplomatic immunity to the personnel of American military advisory missions in Iran as was customary with all American forces serving abroad including in European countries, Khomeini issued a declaration and also preached a sermon denouncing it as “a document for the enslavement of Iran.” The Parliament, he alleged, had “acknowledged that Iran is a colony; it has given America a document attesting that the nation of Muslims is barbarous.”[40] He again called on the people not to permit those scandalous events to occur in Iran and to rise up to bring down the government. This time, Khomeini was arrested and quietly banished to Turkey, from whence he moved to Najaf in Iraq and continued his anti‑government activities from exile.
The revolt instigated by Khomeini against the Shah died soon after his exile to Turkey, and he was no longer regarded as a serious threat until the events of 1978 brought him back to prominence. Meanwhile, the White Revolution, augmented by many new reforms, ushered in a long period of unprecedented economic and social progress, accompanied by a large measure of political stability in Iran. Between 1963 and 1978, Iran was transformed from a poor, backward and feudal society to a prosperous, progressive and semi-industrialised nation.
To give some indication of the enormous achievements of those years, it is well to make a few comparisons between 1963, when the White Revolution started and 1978, when the forces of destruction became active and black reaction set in. In 1963, about 2,000,000 pupils were attending primary and secondary schools throughout Iran. In 1978, more than 11,000,000 children were receiving free education and free meals in Iranian schools. In 1963, the total number of university students did not exceed 13,000. In 1978, there were nearly 200,000 students in modern Iranian universities, over a third of them girls and over half of them from rural areas, the vast majority of whom received generous government grants and subsidised food and housing. In addition, there were nearly 100,000 Iranian students in foreign universities, many of whom received government grants. During this period, the illiteracy rate had fallen from 85 per cent of the population to 55 per cent.
There was a great improvement in the standards of health and hygiene, and steps were taken towards the formation of a comprehensive national health service. The income per capita had risen from 150 U.S. dollars in 1963 to about 2,500 dollars at the time of the Shah’s downfall. From 1963 to 1974, Iran achieved one of the highest, sustained rates of economic growth in the world. Vast industrial projects such as steel mills, engineering complexes, petrochemicals and mining were already completed or in the process of implementation. For the first time in its history, Iran was acquiring a fairly large and growing industrial labour force.[41]
Perhaps even more important than economic advances was the degree of social change that was achieved under the late Shah. Women, who constitute half of the population, were emancipated from their age‑old bondage, and Iran’s family protection laws of 1967 were among the most progressive in the world. The old class structure based on the old feudal order broke down, and Iran acquired a large and growing professional middle class. Most government officials and high‑ranking army officers were the children of poor parents who had come up in society as a consequence of new educational opportunities and their own personal merit.
Iran’s foreign policy was moderate and restrained. Despite the strong army that the Shah had created, he did not indulge in adventurism and bullying. While the Shah did not hide his pro‑Western sympathies, he was first and foremost a nationalist. His relations with the Eastern bloc countries, including both the Soviet Union and China, were progressively cordial, while he continued to maintain strong links with the West.
All these were positive and enlightened policies, and no degree of vilification and false accusation by the mullahs can hide the tremendous progress which Iran had achieved under his reign, and which may yet prove the undoing of the mullahs.
THE GATHERING STORM
However, despite all these positive factors, the regime was beset by many problems and suffered many, mainly self‑inflicted wounds. The Shah’s growing autocratic tendencies, his unrealistic ambitions for transforming a largely poor and conservative society into one of the world’s six most industrialized economies within a few years, his indifference and even contempt towards the feelings of his fellow countrymen, his impatience with any form of opposition, the unnecessary and arbitrary harshness of his secret services, and his serious illness which had sapped all his energies and destroyed his willpower combined to undo all that he had laboriously achieved over a thirty-seven-year reign. Iran fell victim to its success and became a prey to the forces of darkness and ignorance that had been biding their time for an opportune moment to inflict their deadly blow.
Iran’s real problems started in 1974 when its oil revenues quadrupled overnight. That sudden jump in unearned income put the economy into a tailspin and created many economic, social, political and even psychological dislocations. It further inflated the Shah’s ego and fed his already excessive ambitions. It set the country on a course for which it was not yet ready, and created unrealistic expectations which could not be satisfied. It further widened the gap between the super‑rich and the poor. It also introduced a new dimension of greed, materialism, vulgarity and immorality that further weakened the foundations of the society. When the short‑lived economic boom gave way to a recession in the late seventies, and people’s dream of unending horizons was rudely shattered by a sudden return to cold reality, there was nothing that could hold a fractured nation together.
The short‑lived boom had created a vast army of uprooted and alienated urban underclass that had swelled the poorer quarters of the cities. Tehran’s population, which was about one and a half million in 1956, had tripled during the next twenty years and was approaching nearly five million at the time of the revolution. The same story was more or less repeated in many other big cities. Most of the new influx to urban areas was composed of rural people who had flocked to cities in search of gold that they failed to find. They had lost their roots and were in search of a new identity and a new cause. They were ready raw material for a demagogue to mould them into a revolutionary force. Khomeini was perfectly suited to perform this task.
A YEAR OF PROTEST AND LIBERALISATION
The Shah, who was aware of the emerging problems, tried to speed up the pace of liberalisation. Greater press freedom, a measure of political dissent, less repressive security operations and a more open intellectual climate were among the first fruits of the new liberalisation.[42] Secular opposition forces, sensing a change in the political climate, made demands for greater freedom. In May 1977, fifty‑three prominent lawyers addressed a letter to the imperial court, demanding an independent judiciary. In June, three leaders of the National Front, a coalition of parties that had supported the government of Dr Mosaddeq, wrote directly to the Shah calling for complete press freedom and an end to all censorship. There were many more open protests and petitions to the Shah and the Prime Minister, calling for the release of political prisoners, the curbing of the activities of secret services, the establishment of independent political parties, and many other liberal demands.[43]
While this process of liberalisation was going on, there was another alignment of extreme left-wing and right‑wing forces that were opposed to liberal democracy and advocated total revolution. That coalition was made up of Khomeini’s followers, as well as the most militant Marxist and left‑wing groups, including the pro‑Moscow Tudeh Party and the armed Mojahedin-e Khalq [MKO] and Feda’iyan-e Khalq guerrilla groups. Most left‑wing forces, having failed to topple the Shah’s regime through their guerrilla activities, decided that the only way they could achieve their aim was through a coalition with the reactionary religious extremists.
Nurredin Kianuri, a grandson of Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri – the most prominent cleric to oppose the 1906 Constitutional Movement ‑ who later became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, in an important article in World Marxist Review (February 1976) admitted the failure of the leftist forces to pose a serious threat to Shah’s regime and called for an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, the clergy and some elements within the armed forces. Kianuri argued that “the revolution in Iran is at its initial, i.e. anti‑imperialist and democratic state,” and that Tudeh should include in its alliance “social forces in Iran which, though far removed from the left, even from anything democratic, are eager to see the present regime done away with.”
It was this tactical and opportunistic alliance that brought the hard left and the extreme right together in their common quest to topple the Shah. The Shah, caught between these opposing tendencies, was unable to follow a clear and coherent policy because any concession which he made to the liberal and democratic elements ‑ something which he desired to do ‑ was seized upon as a sign of weakness by the revolutionary elements and was used as a weapon against him. This led to a series of contradictory policies and unforgivable blunders both by the regime and by the liberals that ensured the success of the revolution.
Khomeini’s main achievement was not only to enlist the support of the leftist parties and guerrilla groups, but also to present himself as the mouthpiece of the disaffected middle classes and moderate political parties, or, at least, to beat them into submission. Gradually, through a campaign of terror and intimidation, the entire opposition was caught up in the frenzy of the revolution. A movement which had initially started as a bid for greater freedom and democracy ended up as a terrorist campaign which had also assumed strong religious overtones. The outcome was a violent counter‑revolution, using revolutionary jargon.
Khomeini’s army of mullahs, numbering over 150,000, preaching in thousands of mosques throughout the country, began to mobilise the devout masses against the regime.[44] They organised huge rallies on religious holy days and turned them into political occasions; while their trained terrorists set fire to cinemas, banks and shops. In one incident of arson at the Rex Cinema in Abadan, more than 470 spectators were burnt alive, and the blame for that ghastly crime was placed on the Shah’s security forces, further infuriating the unsuspecting mob against the regime.[45] After the revolution, the alleged culprits were arrested, and they confessed that they were acting in keeping with Ayatollah Khomeini’s bidding to act against Western decadence.
Not a single trick of deception was missed by these so‑called divines to create tension and animosity between the population and the government. In the final stages of the revolution, the organisers used to place loudspeakers on rooftops that echoed the sound of tape‑recorded machine gun fire, intensifying hatred and tension among the public. They used to splash animal blood on walls and ditches to antagonise the public against the security forces. There was even a large number of professional mourners placed around Tehran’s main cemeteries who would use every coffin that was brought in to claim it as the body of a martyr to intensify animosity between the people and the regime. Mosques became centres for the distribution of arms and for organising demonstrations, arson, and acts of sabotage. Seldom has there been such a vicious and cynical use of religion for political purposes.
THE PARTING OF WAYS
The Shah left Iran on 16th January 1979, having appointed Dr Shapour Bakhtiar as Prime Minister, who had also received a vote of confidence from both Houses of Parliament. Khomeini returned in triumph on 1st February and went straight from the airport to Tehran’s main cemetery to mourn the martyrs of the revolution for whose deaths he had been chiefly responsible. One of the first things he did was also to appoint Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the Iran Freedom Movement (Nehzat‑e Azadi‑ye Iran), as the head of a provisional government, having dismissed Bakhtiar’s government as illegal. On 10th and 11th February, armed clashes took place between the leftist guerrillas and religious zealots and the Shah’s imperial guard, after the leading generals had declared the army’s neutrality in the contest between Bakhtiar and Bazargan, and the revolution triumphed.[46]
During the post‑revolutionary euphoria, there was a period of short-lived unity between Khomeini’s supporters, on the one hand, and the liberals and the leftist forces, on the other. However, as each group tried to claim its share of the revolutionary inheritance, the temporary unity gave way to disagreement and animosity. Although Bazargan was nominally in charge of the government, the real power resided with the shadowy “Revolutionary Council,” appointed by Khomeini and dominated by the clerics. In his own words, Bazargan was “a knife without the blade.”
Meanwhile, revolutionary courts were set up, headed by militant mullahs, and hundreds of officials of the former regime were subjected to summary trials, followed by mass execution. A large number of firms, factories, companies and private property were confiscated in the name of Islam, and their owners were jailed or executed. Members of religious minorities, especially the Baha’is, were dismissed from their jobs, and many of their leading members were jailed and killed.[47]
The Shah’s family protection laws were declared null and void, and the children who had been born under the provisions of those laws were declared illegitimate. Women organised the first massive demonstration in Tehran and big cities, protesting against the compulsory use of hijab, or covering their heads and bodies, but they were forced back to the wearing of the veil, and there were many ugly scenes involving women whose hair was not adequately covered. Some women were buried up to their waists in the sand and stoned to death on charges of prostitution, the first stone being always thrown by a mullah. Meanwhile, polygamy and temporary marriages (taking of concubines) were again made legal, with the age of marriage for girls being lowered to nine, in keeping with Islamic law.
There was also growing harassment of political parties by groups of Hezbollahi (the partisans of the Party of Allah), and severe censorship of un-Islamic publications was imposed. The security apparatus was run by “Islamic Committees”, located in mosques and headed by mullahs, enforcing their arbitrary rule through religious vigilantes who had armed themselves during the revolution and called themselves “revolutionary guards.” In short, the revolution was followed by a reign of terror and total lawlessness.
Despite the wishes of many liberal and leftist elements, Khomeini declared that the future government should be an “Islamic Republic.” Contrary to his earlier promises both in his first address after returning to Iran and in the letter he wrote to Bazargan appointing him as Prime Minister, where Khomeini had said that a Constituent Assembly would be formed to draft the new Constitution, he decreed the formation of an “Assembly of Experts,” dominated by the clerics, to draw up the new Constitution which, as expected, gave unlimited power to Khomeini and institutionalised the concept of Velayat‑e Faqih. Even some leading members of the clergy objected to this. Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shari’atmadari, the leading Marja’e Taqlid (source of emulation) in Iran, who had incidentally saved Khomeini’s life by declaring him an ayatollah, said that not only was Velayat-e Faqih against the notion of national sovereignty, it was “an innovation, perhaps even a heresy.”[48]
Those people who had hoped that the revolution would result in greater freedom and democracy and would lead to higher living standards and greater social justice were soon disillusioned. Ethnic clashes soon broke out in various parts of the country, chiefly in Kordestan, Khuzestan and northern provinces. In the wake of the disruptions caused in factories and farms and the mismanagement of the economy, there was mass unemployment and high inflation. The regime was faced with growing dissatisfaction, and both the liberals and the leftist forces began to criticise the growing monopolisation of power by the mullahs.
Faced with these insurmountable problems, Khomeini approved the seizure of the American embassy as a diversionary tactic.[49] On 4th November 1979, a group of religious fanatics calling themselves “Muslim students following the Imam’s line,” led by a militant cleric called Mohammad Kho’iniha, who is the present Revolutionary Prosecutor of the country, attacked the American embassy in Tehran and seized all American diplomats at the embassy hostage.
The occupation of the American embassy was seen by many regime loyalists as a brilliant tactical move that consolidated the power of the mullahs and silenced their opponents. The liberal elements were intimidated by highly selective and even fraudulent leaks from the embassy files about their alleged links with the “Great Satan”; while the leftist forces were jubilant about that audacious “anti‑imperialist” move, which humiliated America and put an end to the possibility of the return of the monarchists or other right‑wing elements to power.
The embassy saga was stage‑managed to great effect and was drawn out for as long as any benefit could be derived from it. It assumed the characteristics of some of the passion plays that were staged by the mullahs each year in the month of Muharram, mourning the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, at which they are past masters. The fact that it destroyed Iran’s international reputation as a law‑abiding country and entailed great financial losses was of little consequence to the mullahs, who were purely interested in holding on to power. Their anti‑American campaign also won them many friends among the nations and groups that were hostile to the West. However, Iran paid a very heavy price for that illegal and outrageous act. In addition to the blocking of Iranian assets abroad, probably without the hostage crisis, Saddam Hussein would not have dared attack Iran, would not have received the backing of the West, and Iran would not have been left so isolated and unable to defend itself.
Another event that greatly strengthened the hands of the mullahs and ensured their hold on power was the foolish and criminal Iraqi attack on Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980 produced the effect of uniting all the people behind the regime in power in defence of the homeland. There was open warfare between some elements of the regime and between the mullahs and their former leftist allies. People who thought that they were going to get greater freedom and democracy as a result of the revolution were fighting against the monopolisation of power by the mullahs.
If the events had continued as before, the mullahs would have faced serious challenges that might have forced them out of power. However, Saddam Hussein’s aggressive and illegal invasion of Iran united all elements of the society in defence of their country. Even many army officers and pilots who had been dismissed and jailed by the mullahs volunteered to go to the front to fight against the external enemy.
By making use of these events, the mullahs carried out necessary purges and consolidated their hold on power. At first, with the support and collaboration of leftist forces, they singled out the liberals. Bazargan’s government resigned on the day when the American embassy was occupied. Many moderate opponents of the regime were accused of being lackeys of the West and were forced out of office.
Shortly after, presidential elections were held and Abol-Hasan Bani‑Sadr, who called himself Khomeini’s “devoted son,” was elected the first President of the Islamic Republic. However, soon he encountered the same problem that had paralysed Bazargan’s government; namely, the interference and growing power of the mullahs. A clergy‑dominated “Islamic Consultative Assembly” and influential mullahs running the judiciary and many other government departments soon made it impossible for Bani‑Sadr to function, while a semi‑educated former street vendor called Raja’i was appointed Prime Minister and wielded more power than the President. Bani‑Sadr was impeached by the Iranian Majles (parliament) in June 1981, dismissed by Khomeini, and went into hiding. He was tried in his absence on charges of treason in the conduct of the war and was sentenced to death, but he managed to flee to France
After the destruction of the liberals, it was the turn of the Mojahedin and Feda’iyan guerrilla movements to be exterminated. During the first presidential election, Mas’ud Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin, announced his candidacy for President. However, Khomeini personally disqualified him from running on the excuse that the Mojahedin had boycotted the referendum for the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Their candidates were also barred from running for Parliament.
Finding the door to constitutional opposition closed, the Mojahedin opted for armed struggle against the regime. On 28 June 1981, a powerful bomb planted by the Mojahedin shattered the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), where a party meeting was in progress. The bomb killed over seventy persons, including Mohammad Beheshti, the powerful IRP chairman, and many cabinet ministers and parliamentary deputies. On 30 August, another bomb exploded at the Prime Minister’s office, killing Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the Prime Minister, and Raja’i, who had succeeded Bani-Sadr as president, as well as the head of the police. There were several other outrages and assassinations. The regime responded in kind and started the mass arrest and execution of Mojahedin sympathisers. According to the Mojahedin, more than twenty thousand of their members were killed in 1981.[50]
While this merciless suppression of the Mojahedin and Feda’iyan guerrillas was going on, the Tudeh Party continued its support for the “progressive clergy” and “revolutionary Islam”, condemning the activities of the guerrilla movements as “adventurist and opportunistic.” The Party’s main theoretician, the well‑known writer Ehsan Tabari, wrote a widely‑circulated booklet, “The Progressive Clergy and Us”, in which he argued: “The programme of social development posed by scientific socialism has some affinities with social demands and principles of Islam and Shi’ism… and this fact makes co-operation between supporters of socialism and progressive clergy and its supporters not only possible but imperative.”[51] In an article in World Marxist Review in 1982, entitled “The Role of Religion in Our Revolution,” Tabari claimed that Islam “is the ideology of the anti‑imperialist revolution,” and he sang the praises of “Imam Khomeini”, while attacking “liberals” such as Bazargan and National Front members, as well as “extreme leftist groupings.”[52]
As late as March 1983, in another article in World Marxist Review, Kianuri, the Secretary General of the Tudeh Party, praised Imam Khomeini’s “anti‑imperialist line” and lambasted the “divisive activity of leftists, Maoist‑type extremists and their like.” He added: “The vigilance of the masses and Imam Khomeini’s firm leadership are the most dependable guarantees of defending the achievements of the revolution.”
However, when Vladimir Kuzichkin, the Vice Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, defected to the West in October 1982, he placed the entire membership of the Tudeh Party at the disposal of the Iranian regime, and it was discovered that members of the Tudeh Party had penetrated many sensitive organs of the government, including the armed forces. On 6 February 1983, in one fine swoop, the revolutionary guards arrested some 8,000 members of the Tudeh Party throughout the country, including all their leadership cadres. On 25 February 1984, ten leading Tudeh Party members, including Captain Bahram Afzali, the Navy Commander, were executed, and many of the other party members are still languishing in jail.[53]
Shortly before the victory of the revolution, I ran into an old university friend who had been a member of the Tudeh Party. Although he had officially left the party, he had continued to maintain his left-leaning ideas. In a sarcastic tone, he complained that he had not seen me in many demonstrations and meetings organised at the university in support of the revolution. I asked him how, as a leftist intellectual, he could support a revolution whose earliest manifestations had been attacks against women, minorities, and many freedoms that he believed in. He laughed and said that I was naïve. He continued: “Can you not see what Khomeini has done? Can’t you see the millions who have come to the streets to demonstrate due to his instructions? Do you think that leftist forces alone would have been able to mobilise such huge crowds of illiterate and semi-literate people to fight against the regime?”
He went on to speak in a dismissive and even rude way about Khomeini, stressing that he was an ignorant mullah who was being used by the left to achieve its goals. He continued: “Once the revolution is successful, we will kick him back to a mosque or a religious seminary where he belongs and where he can preach as much as he likes, and we will run the state.” Clearly, both moderate and radical leftist groups were hoping to use Khomeini for their own ends. However, what happened in practice was that Khomeini used them to achieve power, and then he crushed them in a way that the Shah neither would nor could have done.
Thus, by the end of 1984, all liberal, secular and leftist opposition to the regime was completely suppressed, and the mullahs achieved total control of all the levers of power in the country. The cohesion which had been achieved between all the clerics who were in power could be clearly seen in the Irangate affair. Although the revelation of extensive links existing between Hashemi‑Rafsanjani and other leading members of the regime with members of the US administration, and even the purchase of weapons from Israel, could have been extremely damaging under other circumstances, this time the matter was completely hushed up.
When some radical elements associated with Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri’s bureau became suspicious of mysterious dealings between Hashemi-Rafsanjani and US officials and leaked the news of Robert McFarlane’s visit to Tehran to the Lebanese newspaper ‘al‑Shira’, they were arrested and executed on charges of numerous cases of murder both before and after the revolution. Hashemi‑Rafsanjani went on the offensive and declared that McFarlane had come to Tehran on a mission on behalf of the American President, but had been arrested and detained, and no Iranian official had agreed to meet him, and he had been sent back a few days later empty‑handed. Shortly afterwards, Khomeini repeated the same story, calling on the officials to remain united and to concentrate all their efforts against America.
However, during the past few months, there have been many clear signs that there is deep disagreement in the country; this time among the inner circles of the mullahs themselves, which has forced Khomeini to interfere in person to mediate between them and to issue various new fatwas about the power of government, which are in sharp contrast to what he had elaborated in his Velayat-e Faqih.
VEAVAT‑E MOTLAQE-YE FAQIH
Ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, a major debate has been going on between the more radical elements of the regime who wish to pass necessary laws to solve some of the pressing social and economic problems of the country, and the more conservative elements among the clergy and especially the members of the Guardian Council who have blocked those laws due to their non‑conformity with Islamic teachings. This has been a major stumbling block for the government.
In a recent speech, the Iranian Prime Minister Mir‑Hossein Musavi said that in 1979, the Cabinet set up ten committees to draw up plans and prepare draft bills for the solution of some of the major economic problems of the country.[54] These bills included the nationalisation of foreign trade, agricultural reform, labour laws, requisition of property, curbs on the power of the merchants and shopkeepers to prevent hoarding and profiteering, public debts to banks, and taxation. These issues constituted the very basis of government policies, as they were concerned with the most important political, economic, judicial and social matters and defined the direction that an Islamic government should take.
Those bills were prepared by the Cabinet and sent to the Majlis for ratification. After a great deal of debate and numerous amendments, those bills were eventually ratified by the Majlis and sent to the Guardian Council to decide on their compatibility with the Shari’a and the Constitution. Without exception, the Guardian Council rejected all these major bills as being contrary to Islamic laws. For instance, the issue of land reform or the requisition of urban land was opposed by the Guardian Council, because they were contrary to Islamic teaching about the inviolability of personal property.
Labour laws were regarded as contrary to age-old Islamic laws on contractual employment or the freedom of an employer to come to an agreement with an employee through mutual consent without any third-party interference or any limitations imposed by the government or any other authority. Even the issue of taxation aroused a great deal of controversy, as many clerics believed that Islamic taxation was limited to khums (one‑fifth of surplus earnings) and zakat (charitable donations usually defined as 2.5% of wealth). In fact, one of Khomeini’s frequent criticisms of the Shah’s regime was that it levied taxes apart from those prescribed by Islam. He further categorically stated: “If an Islamic government is achieved, it will have to be administered based on taxes that Islam has established, khums, zakat, jizya and kharaj.”[55]
The result was a deadlock which had paralysed any effective government action, had led to intense hopelessness and frustration among the ministers, and had given rise to a feeling among the public that the Islamic government was incapable of solving any of the contemporary problems.
Eventually, on 3 June 1987, the members of the Guardian Council and Majlis deputies went to see Khomeini to sort out their differences. Hashemi‑Rafsanjani, the powerful Majlis Speaker and one of the advocates of radical measures, made a speech in which he referred to the absolute dead‑end faced by the Majlis and the Guardian Council. He said that the country had reached a state of deadlock and only Khomeini’s personal involvement and decisive guidance as Vali‑ye Faqih could solve the problem.
Hashemi‑Rafsanjani said that although they felt ashamed of taking those problems to Khomeini, the matter needed Khomeini’s “precise and clear intervention”. He added: “This matter needs courage, audacity and decisiveness, which under the present circumstances no one under the sun possesses to solve our problems, except Your Eminence. If you do not come to our assistance at this juncture in the history of the revolution and if you do not solve these legislative problems clearly and decisively, we will never be certain of finding someone who will be capable of discharging this important duty in the future”. On that occasion, in a brief speech, Khomeini merely said that he would pray for them.[56]
The deadlock continued, and the arguments between the two factions grew more intense. However, since December 1987, through the exchange of some letters and by issuing several important fatwas, Khomeini has made a dramatic intervention and has completely shifted the terms of the debate in favour of those who wanted to ignore Islamic laws in favour of the government expediency. Khomeini’s new fatwas were promulgated in three letters.
The first one was in response to a query by the Minister of Labour, Abolqasem Sarhaddizadeh. On 7th December 1987, in a letter to Khomeini, the minister had requested: “… Because of the nature of this Ministry’s work in the manufacturing and service units in the private sector, would Your Eminence please guide this Ministry on the following question: Is it possible to introduce obligatory regulations for those units which use state and public facilities and services such as water, electricity, telephone, fuel, foreign currency, raw materials, ports, roads, jetties, the administrative and banking systems, etc.; whether they have used these facilities in the past, continue to use them now, or have recently started to use them?” The purport of this letter was that, as the government provided the private sector with certain facilities such as ports, roads, water and electricity, whether it could be regarded as, in effect, a partner in the dealings of the private sector and whether it could impose binding laws on its operation or not. Khomeini’s brief fatwa was: “In His Exalted Name! In both cases, that is for the past and present, the government can introduce and implement obligatory regulations”.[57]
This ruling led to a great deal of excitement among government circles, and shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Musavi claimed that this ruling had wider implications and was not confined purely to labour laws. This interpretation was rejected by the Guardian Council and led to renewed controversy among the clerics, including both the outside critics of the regime as well as some influential elements within it, about the extent of the powers of the government to interfere with religious laws.
Eventually, on 23 December, Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, in a letter to Khomeini, voiced the objections of the Guardian Council to the implications of his fatwa, which would directly contradict Shari’a laws. Ayatollah Safi wrote:
“We are troubling you about the fatwa issued by Your Eminence with regards to the ruling that the government can, in return for the use of public resources and services, enforce binding terms. Many people have stated that, based on your fatwa, the government by using this power can replace the fundamental and primary laws of Islam with any other kind of social, economic, labour, family, commercial, urban or agricultural laws and systems; and can make the services and facilities which are the monopoly of the state, and which the people have little or no choice but to utilise, into an instrument for the implementation of general and comprehensive policies. In this way, it can forbid that which is binding or make binding that which is forbidden or mubah [permitted but optional] according to the Shari’a. Obviously, in the case of those facilities that are not state monopolies and in which the state figures as an ordinary party or in cases that do not relate to public issues, or when it concerns the utilisation of a particular service, your reply concerning those sets of circumstances is correct and irrefutable. However, concerning public affairs and services, the provision of which has been placed under the monopoly of the state, its designation as a binding condition, covering a variety of regulations not extendable to all cases… has given rise to the anxiety that all Islamic laws regarding muzari’ah [a contract between a landlord and his farmer], rent, commerce, family, or other relationships would be practically discarded and would be placed in danger of change and replacement. In short, this fatwa has opened the floodgate to all those who wish to use it to bring about any kind of social and economic order.”[58]
Ayatollah Safi ended his letter with the prayer, “May your blessings and guidance and your efforts for the protection of Islam long continue!” obviously hoping that Ayatollah Khomeini would discharge his duty as the guardian of the Shari’a against the inroads of radical secularists. However, Khomeini’s letter was as disappointing to his own hand‑picked jurists who had been appointed to the Guardian Council to block the approval of un‑Islamic laws by the Majlis, as it was welcome to those elements who wished to press on with their reforms regardless of their incompatibility with Islamic principles. The text of Khomeini’s response was as follows:
“In His Exalted Name! The government can, in all cases in which the people utilise the facilities and services provided by the government, according to Islamic terms and even without being bound by the terms of value, take away from the people what is being utilised by them. This is enforceable in all cases that come under the control of the government, and it is not limited to the cases mentioned in the Minister of Labour’s letter. Rather, it can enforce its terms, without any prior conditions, or with binding conditions in the case of natural resources, resources which during the entire life-span of the Islamic government are under the power of the government. The honourable gentlemen should not pay attention to rumours circulated by irresponsible profiteers or those opposed to the Islamic Republic; rumours can be created regarding any issue”.[59]
Khomeini did not address any of the real objections raised by the Guardian Council to his earlier ruling. On the contrary, he widened the scope of his earlier fatwa and merely admonished the Council members not to listen to the rumours. This latest fatwa created a great commotion, and many religious experts, both within the ruling party, as well as those outside it, could not believe what they were hearing; because through that fatwa Khomeini had, at a stroke, declared all the rulings of the Guardian Council ever since its establishment as null and void and had practically disbanded it. The ayatollahs appointed as members of the Guardian Council were supposed to be the greatest experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and they were given the task of protecting the Shari’a and the Constitution. However, here Khomeini was saying that all their major rulings had been contrary to Islam and that the government could enact and enforce any law it wished based on the supreme authority vested in it by God.
Some factions friendly to Khomeini and the Islamic Republic tried to salvage what they could from the situation. In his sermon during the Friday congregational prayers in Tehran, speaking about the powers of the government, President Khamene’i paid due respect to Khomeini and praised his decisive leadership. Even contrary to the accepted Shi’i belief and practice that any believer is free to follow any Marja’e Taqlid (source of emulation or leading mujtahid) whom he regards to be the most eminent, Khamene’i said: “Of course, when we talk of accepted norms and principles in an Islamic society, by that we mean the fatwa of Vali-ye Faqih, because in an Islamic society the religious yardstick of the system is the fatwa of Vali‑ye Faqih. The fatwas of other Maraj’e Taqlid are only valid in personal and individual cases for themselves and their followers, if they have any followers. However, in national and governmental matters, only the fatwa of Vali-ye Faqih is binding. There is no argument about that”.
However, Khamene’i proceeded to defend Khomeini’s latest edicts, saying that when he empowered the executive to make and implement the laws, he meant the laws that were within the framework of Islamic teachings and on secondary (thanawiyyah) issues, not regarding the fundamental laws of Islam, which have been clearly set out in the Koran and the traditions. Making use of Khomeini’s remarks on dismissing the rumours about the implications of his fatwa, Khamene’i deliberately tried to confuse the issue and went on to say: “As the questioner [Ayatollah Safi] has pointed out that some people have understood your remarks to mean that one can nullify the [Islamic] laws regarding muzari’ah, rents, musaqat [laws regarding water rights] and other religious laws and injunctions and that the government can impose conditions contrary to divine laws, the Imam [Khomeini] says no these are rumours, and that such things are basically unrelated to the queries and the answers that are given to them”.[60]
These innocent‑sounding remarks by Khamene’i, which were perhaps meant to heal the rift, further fuelled the controversy and created greater confusion. Was the government empowered to make laws only regarding minor and secondary issues that were not specified in the Shari’a, or did the government enjoy the power to abrogate Shari’a laws and institute new ones in their place? The dispute grew so intense that Khamene’i was forced to write to Khomeini asking him to express his religious opinion to clarify the minds of the public. In his angry response, Khomeini strongly reprimanded Khamene’i and criticised the remarks he had made in his sermon. Pointing out that “I did not wish that any controversy should arise at this sensitive juncture and that in these circumstances I believe silence to be the best attitude”, nevertheless, he felt obliged to express his opinion due to the controversy which had arisen. Given the importance of this judgement, it is necessary to quote this part of his fatwa in full:
“It appears from Your Excellency’s remarks at the Friday Prayer meeting that you do not recognise government as a supreme vicegerency bestowed by God upon the Holy Prophet (God’s salutations and benedictions be upon him and his kin) and that it is one of the most important of divine laws and has priority over all peripheral divine orders. Your interpretation of my remarks that ‘the government exercises power only within the bounds of divine statutes’ is completely contrary to what I have said. If the government exercises power only within the framework of peripheral divine laws, then the entrustment of divine rule and absolute vicegerency to the Prophet of Islam (God’s salutations and benedictions be upon him and his kin) would be hollow and meaningless… I should state that the government, which is a part of the absolute vicegerency of the Prophet of God (God’s salutations and benedictions be upon him and his kin) is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and Hajj pilgrimage. The ruler is authorised to demolish a mosque or a house which is in the path of a road and to compensate the owner. The ruler can close down the mosques, if need be, or can even demolish a mosque which is a source of harm, if its harm cannot be remedied without its demolition. The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any agreements concluded with the people based on Shari’a when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country or of Islam. It can also prevent any devotional [ibadi] or non-devotional affair if it is opposed to the interests of Islam and for so long as it is so. The government can prevent the Hajj pilgrimage, which is one of the most important divine obligations, temporarily in cases when it is contrary to the interests of the Islamic country…”[61]
In this letter, Khomeini accuses President Khamene’i of having misunderstood Islamic teachings and even of having misinterpreted and distorted Khomeini’s own remarks. It should be borne in mind that, in addition to being the President of the Islamic Republic, Khamene’i is also the Friday Imam (congregational prayer leader) of Tehran and a middle-ranking cleric in his own right. To accuse him of having misunderstood Islamic teachings on such a fundamental issue is a very damning indictment of such a person who was serving as the clerical president of the country. However, the real significance of Khomeini’s remarks rests on its implications for the entire system of the Islamic Republic.
The main criticism levelled by the mullahs against the former ‘Satanic regime’ of the Shah was that the former regime was based on secular, non‑Islamic laws. The main justification for the establishment of an Islamic Republic was that it would enforce the Shari’a and would subject the government to the observance of religious laws. This is why the National Iranian Constitution was annulled and replaced by an Islamic Constitution. This is why the Parliament or the “National Consultative Assembly” was changed to the “Islamic Consultative Assembly”. This is why the Guardian Council was placed above the Majlis to ensure the compatibility of its resolutions with the Shari’a. This is why all leading judicial bodies are headed by the clerics and why secular judges were replaced by Shari’a judges.
In short, the main claim of the regime to legitimacy was that it was formed to enforce the Shari’a. Hokumat‑i mashruteh (Constitutional Government) was replaced by Hokumat-e mashru’a (Religious Government or government based on the Shari’ah). Yet, at a stroke, Ayatollah Khomeini dismisses the entire system and gives up any pretence of government being subject to religious laws. He even states that the government is a part or an extension of the absolute rule of the Prophet and “has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and Hajj pilgrimage”, even though according to the beliefs of both Sunnis and Shi’is, the last three injunctions, with the profession of faith and the payment of religious dues, are regarded as “the five pillars of Islam”, taking precedence over all other teachings.
This was done even though the Prophet never claimed such powers for himself and repeatedly described himself as “God’s slave and apostle”, only conveying what God had revealed to him. With those edicts, Khomeini has destroyed the very basis of the Islamic Republic and has removed the source of its legitimacy. It can be claimed that not only has he introduced an innovation in Shi’ism, but he has also practically abrogated the laws of Islam and has claimed powers and prerogatives which go well beyond what the Prophet claimed for himself.
These latest rulings understandably created quite a stir in the country. However, after some initial mutterings and some rearguard action by some conservative members of the regime, all of them eventually toed the line and expressed their submission to Khomeini’s ruling. In another letter to Khomeini, Khamene’i swallowed his pride and wrote: “Based on Your Eminence’s religious opinions ‑ which I learned from Your Eminence many years ago, and have accepted and acted on ‑ the points and instructions raised in Your Eminence’s letter are part of the certainties, and I, as your servant, accept them all”. Although, pointedly, he added: “What I meant by discussing the religious limits in the Friday prayers sermon is something that I can explain in detail if required”.[62]
On the day when Khomeini rebuked Khamene’i, Hashemi-Rafsanjani speaking in the Majlis, warned the members of the Guardian Council not to ignore Khomeini’s ruling. “The Majlis, we, the deputies, and the esteemed Guardian Council are duty-bound to pay great attention to this issue and to find our way through it; so that no longer do we assume the right in the future to impose something on Islam by raising vague and ambiguous issues … I beg the esteemed Guardian Council, the gentlemen who were appointed by His Eminence the Imam, to pay serious heed to the Imam’s guidance and not to make their own views or those of others an obstacle to the implementation of the Imam’s guidelines.”[63]
Ayatollah Emami‑Kashani, the spokesman of the Guardian Council and one of the four regular preachers at Tehran Friday prayers, made an extraordinary admission. He said: “The recent remarks of the Imam of the Umma [Khomeini] have given the Guardian Council a free hand and have removed the problems faced by the Council, because in the past, whenever the Council saw that a bill was contrary to the holy Shari’a in any way, it did not endorse it. Now, however, with what the Imam has declared, the Labour Law and similar bills will be endorsed”.
He added that although Khomeini had spoken about the power of the government in the past, the Guardian Council had been duty-bound to observe the Shari’a laws. “However, the fact that he has announced this in the form of an edict marks this as a different matter, something which has not been the case in the past; and this matter has given rise to a great deal of discussion in the Guardian Council.”
Immediately after Khomeini’s latest fatwa, huge demonstrations were staged by the “Students Following the Line of the Imam”, a phrase which came into prominence after the seizure of the American Embassy, calling on the authorities to obey Khomeini’s latest fatwa. A two‑day conference was organised in Tehran, composed of all the Friday Imams of the country to discuss Khomeini’s latest edict. Most leading figures addressed the conference and praised Khomeini’s “divine and god‑like” leadership. Ayatollah Musavi‑Ardebili, President of the Supreme Court, in his address, said that the significance of Khomeini’s latest fatwa could “only be compared to the revolution itself”. Ayatollah Jalaluddin Taheri, the Friday Imam of Isfahan, again stressed that Khomeini’s latest edicts were “no less important than the revolution itself”.[64] He even compared the significance of the new powers bestowed by Khomeini on the government with the transfer of vilayat or divine succession by the Prophet to Imam ‘Ali, 23 years after the start of his prophetic mission.[65]
The conference issued a resolution which said that “solving the difficulties caused by differing attitudes on taxation, foreign trade, co-operative societies, private and public sectors, land, housing, inflation, banking issues and dozens of other complicated executive bottlenecks, could be among the valuable blessings of this historic, divine message.”[66] Speaking at the same conference, Prime Minister Musavi boasted that all government problems had been solved as a result of the latest decree, and a new era had started in the history of the Islamic Republic and even in the exportation of the revolution to other countries.
His optimism, however, was rather premature, because despite all the public statements of support for Khomeini’s latest rulings, the wrangling went on and the clash between the Majlis and the Guardian Council continued. Khomeini’s “historic, divine message” had failed to force the ratification of the bills by the Guardian Council. On 6th February, Hashemi‑Rafsanjani, President Khamene’i, Musavi‑Ardebili, the President of the Supreme Court, Prime Minister Musavi, and even Khomeini’s own son and the Director of his Private Office, Ahmad, in a joint letter to him complained: “Your Eminence’s recent statements have theoretically removed difficulties which were seen to be in the way of the legislation and administration of the Islamic Society… The problem which remains is the method of the implementation of the Islamic sovereign right concerning government rulings.”[67]
In his response, Khomeini wrote that when the Majlis and the Guardian Council fail to agree, an assembly should be formed of the members of the Guardian Council and the signatories to the above letter, as well as Mohammad Musavi-Kho’iniha, the leader of the students who had occupied the American Embassy and who also held the post of Revolutionary Prosecutor, and Tavassoli, another member of Khomeini’s Private Office, and any other experts that the above‑mentioned people deemed necessary, and their final decision should be complied with.
He has thus ensured that the above assembly, which came to be known as the Expediency Council, would have a majority that could bypass the objections of the Guardian Council, without having physically abolished that council. Whether the latest measure would be sufficient to silence the opponents of the new laws or whether they would lead to further complications and infighting remains to be seen.
Another bizarre footnote to the latest developments, which shows that controversy will continue, has been the power delegated to the executive by Khomeini to draw up and implement ta’zirat, or religious punishments not clearly set out in the Shari’a. Logically, this power should have been delegated to the judiciary, but in an edict, Khomeini empowered the government to define and implement the laws of ta’zirat, which are usually carried out in the form of floggings and other forms of corporal punishment.
After the latest edict, several government ministries issued statements cataloguing various forms of punishments that they had inflicted on the offenders under the jurisdiction of their ministry. In a statement issued on 29 February 1988, the Governor General of Tehran announced that during the first six months of the implementation of that law in Tehran alone, 239,000 traders had been investigated, out of whom no less than 38,221 had been subjected to corporal punishments or fines, or both.
Because of the latest events, one can make some tentative observations. The first point is that the Islamic Republic has singularly failed to implement Islamic teachings regarding the most fundamental issues facing society. Except for imposing the veil on women, banning the use of alcoholic drinks, inflicting corporal punishment, stoning prostitutes to death and other similar medieval practices, it has not been able to make Islamic laws relevant in any of the major economic, social, cultural and scientific fields.
In addition to the major cases of legislation enumerated above, which had created a deadlock in the system, one of the earliest aims of the regime was to abolish usury and establish interest‑free banking. After many years of debate, eventually, in March 1984, the government abolished interest in domestic banks, although it continued that practice in its foreign dealings. Muslim economists developed the theory that, instead of receiving interest on their deposits, people could deposit their money in the banks as shareholders or take part in joint economic ventures, and share in the profit or the loss of those ventures.
However, as in practice, it proved impossible to isolate any particular deposit and decide whether it had made a loss or a profit, the banks were ordered to pay the depositors eight per cent of “shares of profits” annually across the board. Therefore, all that has happened in practice is that the banks continue paying eight per cent interest on bank deposits, by calling it “shares of profits”, rather than interest. Those who borrow from banks should pay “bank charges”, which are remarkably similar to the interest that was charged on loans in the past.
The second point which should be made is that in attempting to harmonise Islamic teachings with modern realities, the regime has had to re‑interpret those teachings to such an extent that they have ceased to be Islamic any more. Khomeini’s latest fatwas are the best example of this. In a recent Friday sermon, Hashemi‑Rafsanjani made the rare admission that when one scrutinises Islamic laws, one realises that very few of them have any basis in the Koran, and most of them were later formulated by jurists or governments and are no longer applicable. He said: “Many of the rules which we imagine to be fixed and unchangeable when we delve deeply into their background, we find that they have been governmental rules”.[68] Thus admitting that Islam does not have laws for every occasion and that with the change of circumstances, new laws would be needed.
The third observation is that Khomeini remains the most powerful man and the sole arbiter of the system. Despite his old age and ill health, he still personally guides all the main issues of the Islamic Republic, although the latest wrangling has shown that he is not completely capable of enforcing total obedience. Despite expectations, all the major institutions that have been created and have lasted for many years, such as the Guardian Council, the Majlis, the Expediency Council, the Presidency and the Cabinet, do not have any independent power of their own but owe their position and their legitimacy to Khomeini.
In the same Friday sermon referred to above, Hashemi‑Rafsanjani said that, as the Majlis Speaker and as a person elected by the people, he had no right to legislate laws or even to hold his position, “Only the Imam can give me this right”. Referring to various national figures and organisations, he said, “If we take away the Imam’s approval for any of these organisations, then they don’t have any value … If the Imam is not willing for any of us to be in office, then we have no right to participate in anything. The entire system’s legitimacy stems from the position of the Imam. Since the Prophet’s descendant [the Hidden Imam] is not here now, his deputy [Khomeini] becomes the leader.”[69]
All this means that Khomeini exercises more power and influence than any dictator ever could. The only difference is that, instead of calling him the absolute ruler, he is called Vali-ye Faqih, thus misusing his religious position to give him absolute, arbitrary and unchallenged power. The concentration of all that power in Khomeini’s hands and even his hero-worship and deification provide a very wrong model for the administration of the Islamic Republic, both before and after his death and for the future prospects of the regime.
Since a few months before the revolution, Khomeini’s titles have gradually moved up from Ayatollah (the Sign of God) to Ayatollah ‘Uzma (Grand Ayatollah), to Imam, whose use in Shi’ism has always been restricted to the Twelve Imams. In recent years, Khomeini’s edicts and remarks are referred to as “payambar‑guneh” (Prophet‑like), or even “khoday‑guneh” (God‑like); while even Khomeini himself referred to his latest will and testament as his ‘siyasi‑elahi” (political and divine) will and testament. Parallels are found in his life with the life of the Prophet and the Imams. His exile to Iraq is referred to as his “hijra” (migration), corresponding to the Prophet’s migration from Mecca to Medina. Although in the explosion in the Islamic Republic Party in 1981, nearly one hundred persons were killed, the number was subsequently adjusted to 72, corresponding with the number of people who died with Imam Hussein in Karbala. A popular chant and slogan at the end of his speeches is “ma ahl‑e kufeh nistim Imam tanha bemanad” (We are not like the Kufans who would desert the Imam), referring to the fickleness of the Kufans in removing their support for Imam Hussein after having invited him to Kufa.
Based on all that has gone on during the past few years, it becomes clear that although the regime claimed to be Islamic and to be based on Koranic principles, in reality, it was nothing but a third-world dictatorship with religious trappings in which everything revolved around the person of Khomeini. His appointed successor, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, lacked Khomeini’s strength, charisma and ruthlessness, and he was unceremoniously dismissed from his office.
The final point to make is that Khomeini’s rulings, restricting the power of religion and empowering the government to rule without any religious sanction, have paradoxically strengthened the chances of a democratic and secular government in some distant future. Having lived under an Islamic government that was supposed to solve all national and international problems based on the Shari’a, and having experienced its practical and theoretical shortcomings and inadequacies, many Iranians are more inclined to look towards democratic principles and to choose their own form of government. They have learned that the laws of the Shari’a are in no way suited to the requirements of our age and that they will have to make laws through democratically elected parliaments that are in keeping with the needs and requirements of the present age, instead of trying to follow impractical and outdated dogmas and religious injunctions.
There is no doubt that the Shah’s regime suffered from the lack of democratic accountability and popular involvement in the affairs of the state. The former regime definitely needed fundamental reforms based on democratic principles. Ever since the beginning of the 20th century and the Constitutional Revolution, the Iranian people have fought for freedom, independence, democracy and social justice.
Having gone through the costly and unnecessary Islamic revolution, and seeing that either a religious dictatorship or a totalitarian secular system, whether of the left or of the right, will not provide freedom and democracy, the hope is that they will turn to the tried and tested system of democracy, based on the principles of human rights and the UN Charter.
Democracy does accommodate religious faith and all forms of spiritual, religious, intellectual and political views, but a religious dictatorship cannot tolerate democracy and freedom. Above all, Iranians should try to remember what they have gone through so that they will not fall into the same trap again, for “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
Footnotes:
[1] Both Khomeini and all other leading members of the regime have repeatedly stressed that “The only frame of reference for us is the time of the Prophet and Imam ‘Ali.” For instance, see: “Iran’ Les dernières émeutes sont les premières d’une gigantesque explosion,” Le Monde, 6 May 197
[2] For the earliest available biography of Muhammad, see the Sira of Ibn Ishaq as transmitted by Ibn Hisham, translated into English by A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad (London, 1955). For modern accounts of the life of Muhammad and early Islamic history, see: W.M.Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (London, 1961); F. Gabrieli, Muhammad and Conquests of Islam (London, 1968); M. Rodinson, Mohammad (London, 1971)
[3] For a general account of Shi’ism, see: Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985). Also see: S. Husain M. Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shili Islam (Longman, London and New York, 1979); ‘Allamah S. Muhammad Hussein Tabatabali, Shilite Islam, tr. and ed. by S. Hossein Nasr, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1975)
[4] See: William Muir, The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall (Beirut, Khayats, 1963), p. 324
[5] During the revolution, in most of his messages to the Iranian people, Khomeini referred to the Shah as the ‘Yazid of the Age’ or a descendant of Shimr.
[6] See: Momen, op. cit., p. 37.
[7] M.G.S. Hodgson, “How Did the Early Shi’a Become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental Society, MY (1955), p. 11.
[8] Shahrough Akhavai, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1980), p. 67.
[9] Ann K. S. Lambton, “Quis Custodiet Custodes?”, I, Studia Islamica, V (1956), p. 137.
[10] ibid, p. 138
[11] Momen, op. cit., p. 194.
[12] Akhavi, op. cit., pp. 29‑30; Abdul‑Hadi Ha’iri, Shi’ism and Constitutionalism (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1977), p. 270; Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985), p. 24.
[13] Akhavi, op. cit., p. 13.
[14] Momen, op. cit., pp 161-166.
[15] Muhammad ibn Hasan al‑Tusi, Kitab al‑Ghayba, ed. Aqa Buzurg al‑Tihrani (Najaf, 1385/1965), pp. 223‑6.
[16] Ibn Babuya, Kamal al‑Din (Tehran, 1970), p. 156.
[17] See: S. Sadr, Kitab al‑Mahdi, Persian translation by M. J. Najafi (Tehran, 1344/1965); Jassim M. Hussain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam (Muhammadi Trust, London, 1982).
[18] For a translation of this work, see: Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (KPI Ltd, London, 1985), pp. 27‑166. Vilayat also means vice‑regency, and both meanings of the word are intended here; namely, the faq’ih should rule as a vice‑regent of the Hidden Imam.
[19] ibid, p. 27.
[20] ibid, p. 30.
[21] ibid, p. 37.
[22] ibid, p. 47.
[23] ibid, p. 60.
[24] ibid, p. 56.
[25] ibid, p. 56.
[26] ibid, pp. 56‑57.
[27] ibid, p. 83.
[28] ibid. p. 84.
[29] ibid, p. 79.
[30] ibid, p. 89. On the orders of the Prophet, all the male members of the tribe were beheaded by Imam ‘Ali, and their wives and children were taken as slaves.
[31] ibid, p. 116.
[32] ibid, pp. 48‑49.
[33] Koran: IV: 59.
[34] Khomeini, p. 170.
[35] ibid, p. 31.
[36] For a study of the relationship between the state and clergy see: Akhavi, loc cit; Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969); Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984); Nikki R. Keddie, “Is Shi’ism Revolutionary? The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic” (Middle East Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1982), pp 80-100.
[37] Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs ( I. B. Tauris, London, 1985), p 25.
[38] ibid, p 26.
[39] Khomeini va jonbesh (Khomeini and the Movement) (Muharram Publication, 1352/1973), pp 6-7. The recording of this speech is broadcast every year on Tehran Radio on the anniversary of the day it was preached.
[40] Quoted in Bakhash, op. Cit., pp 33-34.
[41] For a study of the Pahlavi period, see George Lenczowski, ed., Iran under the Pahlavis (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, 1978).
[42] The oft-repeated allegation that President Carter’s administration had forced the Shah to liberalise his regime is clearly false, although Carter’s election certainly emboldened the opposition and weakened the Shah’s regime. Moves towards greater liberalisation had started from the early seventies, although the introduction of a one-party system in 1975 was a major setback and reversed many earlier policies. From 1973 onward, a group of writers, poets, intellectuals and mainly university lecturers, whose number ran into thousands, formed an association under the chairmanship of Dr Hooshang Nahavandi, Chancellor of Tehran University, called “The Group for the Investigation of Iranian Problems.” Members of the Group in Tehran and the provinces met regularly, and there was an annual conference at the University of Tehran, followed by an audience with the Shah. In those meetings, many social and political problems were openly discussed, and government ministers and leading politicians were subjected to critical questioning and interrogation. Indeed, a few high-ranking officials, including some ministers, were forced to resign their posts due to strong criticism voiced by the Group. One report of the Group in 1973 criticised the lack of books on controversial political and social issues. This led to the translation and publication of hundreds of books from various languages, including books on Marxism and other socialist ideologies, as well as on the West and Western political schools of thought.
[43] Bakhash, p 16.
[44] Professor Eric Hoogland, who made a study of the clergy in Iran before the revolution, estimated that there were between 150,000 and 180,000 mullahs in Iran. See: The Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic, op. cit., p. 30.
[45] Prior to the fire at the Rex Cinema, at least thirty other cinemas and nightclubs had been set on fire. A caretaker died in a fire in Mashhad, and two cleaners were killed in a fire at a cinema in Shiraz, but most other fires were started when the cinemas were empty.
[46] In a very frank article in the New Left Review (No. 166, November/December 1987), entitled “Socialism or Anti‑Imperialism? The Left and Revolution in Iran”, V. Moghadam speaks about the scope of anti‑Shah activities by the leftist forces and their close collaboration with the mullahs in the period leading to the revolution. She writes: “In fact, it was the Left guerrilla groups ‑principally, the Feda’is ‑ who broke into police stations and army posts, distributed weapons, and joined the NCO rebels… But in another cruel and ironic twist, the Feda’is have one major strength and advantage over the clerics ‑their military expertise ‑ facilitated not so much their integration into the political terrain as the assumption of state power by clerics and their collaborator‑rivals, the so‑called liberals.”
[47] The Baha’is were even ordered to pay back any salary they had received in the course of their previous employment, and all their assets were seized. For a study of the suppression of the Christian church, see: Bishop H. B. Dehqani‑Tafti, The Hard Awakening (Triangle, London, 1981).
[48] Quoted in The Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic, op. cit., p. 43.
[49] Initially, it was not clear whether Khomeini had personally sanctioned the attack on the embassy or not. However, Musavi-Kho’iniha, the leader of the group which occupied the embassy, speaking in a radio interview on the anniversary of the takeover, said that he was approached by several Muslim students who asked his view about an attack on the American embassy. He contacted Khomeini’s son, Ahmad, and informed him of the matter, and he, in turn, consulted his father. As no objection was raised to the plan, he instructed the students to go ahead.
[50] The Mojahedin have provided the names and details of more than seven thousand of their members who were killed in the shoot‑outs or executed by the regime, but they claim that the real number of their supporters who were killed is more than 20,000. In an interview, Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin, claimed that in one night, Khomeini’s regime executed more Mojahedin supporters than the total number of guerrillas killed during the Shah’s reign.
[51] Quoted by V. Moghadam, New Left Review, No. 166, November/December 1987. P 23.
[52] Ibid, pp 23-24.
[53] For the details of the suppression of the Tudeh Party, see: Farhang Jahanpour, “The Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party,” The World Today (April, 1984), pp. 152‑159.
[54] See: Keyhan Hava’i, No. 762, 27 January 1988, p. 3.
[55] Khomeini, Islamic Government, p. 45.
[56] BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Part IV, 5 June 1987. At times, the SWB does not publish the full text of the speeches or letters referred to below. For a full text, please consult “Keyhan” or “Ettela’at” one day after the date of the events.
[57] ibid, 8 December 1987.
[58] ibid, 24 December 1987
[59] ibid.
[60] ibid, 4 January 1988
[61] ibid, 8 January 1988
[62] ibid, 13 January, 1988
[63] ibid, 8 January, 1988.
[64] ibid, 20 January, 1988.
[65] ibid, 21 January, 1988.
[66] ibid.
[67] ibid, 8 February, 1988.
[68] SWB, 18 January, 1988.
[69] ibid.
F Jahanpour 